

Journal of Public Management and International Relations (JPMIR)

ISSN: 3134-8769

Volume 1, Number 2, April 2026

Pp 210-218

International Trade Alliances and the Nigerian Cocoa Export, 1910-2010

Adu-Peters Raliat Olusola

Department of History and Diplomatic Studies

Adeyemi Federal University of Education

Ondo, Nigeria

adu-petersro@afued.edu.ng

ORCID: 0009000095938525

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.51415/jpmir.v1i2.1745>

*Published by the Department of Public Management, Law and Economics
Durban University of Technology, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa*



Abstract

This paper examined Nigeria's participation in international trade since cocoa became a viable commodity for cultivation and trade. Cocoa exports initially received full financial support from the Nigerian government when large quantities were shipped to international markets before oil was discovered. Major historical epochs, such as the end of the World Wars, the crude oil boom, and the Structural Adjustment Programme, prompted countries around the world to pursue economic liberalisation, and the Nigerian government withdrew entirely from financing the agricultural sector. Cocoa export became privatised and was left under the control of private marketers who lacked the necessary infrastructure to properly handle exports to international markets. This study used both primary and secondary data. Primary data were collected using a questionnaire and unstructured interviews. 10 of the 29 functional cocoa-exporting companies in Nigeria were selected to administer the questionnaire because they have more workers. Focused Group Discussions were also conducted with 10 officials of the Cocoa Association of Nigeria (CAN), 2 senior members of the Cocoa Processor Association of Nigeria (COPAN), and 2 senior members of the Nigeria Institute of Internal Affairs (NIIA), to gain insights into the prospects and challenges of cocoa export in Nigeria. Data were also gathered from printed materials such as books, journals, bulletins, conference proceedings, and seminars, as well as from the Internet. The data collected were interpreted from a historical perspective. Findings showed that Nigerian cocoa exporters have been penalised by the World Trade Organisation for violating export rules. A new trade agreement was drafted, and Nigeria refused to sign. The refusal led to the imposition of another penalty, which attracted a 10 per cent tariff on cocoa exports from Nigeria. Nigeria, in turn, imposed a 10 per cent tax on its cocoa exporters. The paper concluded that cocoa exporters hope to retain their export position, and stakeholders were sensitised on the need for readjustment to maximise international trade benefits.

Keywords: *International Trade Alliances, Nigeria, Cocoa export.*

Introduction

Cocoa was the principal cash crop introduced by the British imperialists in the late nineteenth century and had become widely cultivated by 1900. It was considered a veritable source of revenue and of raw materials for export. Cocoa trade and marketing began in 1910, when 3,000 metric tonnes were exported to international markets. Also, tonnage exportation increased profitably for the marketers between 1920 and 1945 under the specifications of statutory marketing Boards of the central agency known as the West Africa Produce Marketing Board (WAPMB). In the post-World War era, specifically in 1948, global communities were synchronised under a unilateral trade body to promote equity and fairness in trade relations and related matters. Subsequently, in 1949, there was a global call for the readjustment of domestic and overseas marketing, which necessitated the establishment of another marketing board to buy and set prices for cocoa and other commodities under the Trade Act of the Nigerian Produce Marketing Company in the United Kingdom. By 1954, the Nigerian government rose in full control of trade commodity production and export market, through the establishment of the Western Region Marketing Board to take up cocoa marketing in the Western Region as the West African Marketing Board was regionalised for export purposes.

However, immediately after crude oil was discovered in 1956, the Central Marketing Board and the Nigerian Produce Marketing Company in London began to collapse and were eventually dissolved between 1957 and 1958, consequent upon the gradual withdrawal of the federal government from agricultural produce to oil exploration. Between 1973 and 1977, the cocoa production sector suffered a major financial setback, and the regional marketing boards were scrapped and replaced by the New Nigeria Cocoa Board (NNCB), which bought and exported cocoa and other cash crops (coffee, tea, kola nuts, and cashew nuts). At this point, cocoa maintenance, including subsidisation, became the sole responsibility of the NNCB, through the regime of Licensed Buying Agents (LBAs) to the London markets. The Central Bank of Nigeria continued to disburse funds to cocoa grading and export under the various state governments.

The global economic recession of the 1980s seriously dampened cocoa production and export, and the eventual collapse of the Board in 1986, when the Structural Adjustment Programme was adopted from the Bretton Woods institutions. The main objective of the institutions was to liberalise trade connections through the Liberalisation Act of 1986. Nigeria's cocoa trade, amid economic readjustment and trade deregulation, began to shift toward a handoff policy by the federal and state governments. This scenario

ushered in the interests of some wealthy private individuals who pursued the business for profit, as SAP's purpose and objectives were market- or capital-oriented. At the time, the Nigerian government struggled to stabilise the agricultural sector; its main attention was also diverted to maximising dividends from the oil business. The introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes for economic adjustment significantly contributed to the collapse of Nigeria's strong trade connections with European markets.

Statement of the Problem

Dani (2003) and Akinwande (2007) posited that the major agricultural commodity that brought Nigeria into the limelight of international trade in the modern dispensation was cocoa. Nigeria's cocoa trade was bedevilled by internal and external challenges since the end of the Second World War. Aluko (2003) noted that the bifurcated menace persisted until the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was recommended as a cutthroat remedy for economic stabilisation. Olagbaju (2003) also clarified that the oil discovery in 1956 led to a labour shift from agriculture to oil work in cities and refineries in the 1970s, and to the full privatisation of the agrarian sector in 1986.

SAP, which was deliberately embraced as a panacea for economic stabilisation, ended up strangulating the very process it was meant to stabilise. In the wake of the SAP era, the Nigerian government withdrew funding from the agricultural sector, leaving it to private individuals who ran it in a "survival of the fittest" race (Darwin, 1859). Only wealthy private companies were able to build infrastructure to sell cocoa into the European Union markets. Adu-Peters (2010) affirmed that a more horrendous experience occurred in the first quarter of 2008, when the European Union stopped buying Nigerian cocoa because it was poorly handled by individuals who lacked the infrastructural capacity to produce and process high-standard cocoa seeds for the world market, consequent upon the liberalisation of the trade sector. Adu-Peters (2010) further clarified that poor private exporters took loans from commercial banks at high interest rates of between 20 and 25 per cent, thereby reducing their ability to maximise profits from the business. The business's strength waned due to the export of substandard seeds to global markets.

Sequel to the above, in 2008, the WTO, acting on behalf of the European Union, issued a trade threat against Nigeria's cocoa exports, resulting in a loss of a whopping \$360,000 per week in trade balance. Hence, the exporters, through the Cocoa Processor Association of Nigeria (COPAN), sought a rescue from the Nigerian government to no avail, capitalising on the existing principle of economic deregulation and liberalisation governing the export business. Whereas governments of other cocoa-exporting West African countries, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, continued to diplomatically subsidise the business despite the regime of deregulation and liberalisation. As a result, Felix (2008) posited that Nigeria was dragged into a new trade agreement with stringent policies intended to frustrate Nigeria's cocoa exports in international markets. It was a bilateral agreement between the cocoa-exporting countries from West Africa. The home governments of Ghana, Cameroon, and Côte d'Ivoire signed the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), while the Nigerian government refused to sign for exporters, despite EU warnings about the economic litigation consequences of WTO disputes.

Theoretical Analysis

There are laudable ideas propounded by fundamentalists in international studies whose thoughts have assisted in understanding how the international system works and how nations of the world come together to engage under a democratic political structure for the betterment of collective interests. Dependency theory was found suitable to analyse the relationship between the two opposing economic structures of the wealthy and poor states in global trade with emphasis on their trades commodities, the terms of trade and the trade benefits. The main ideas of dependency theory centre on two major aspects: core-periphery economic relations and unequal commodity exchange.

Core and Periphery economic relations

Scholars of dependency theory postulated that the globe was bifurcated into two seemingly parallel economic lines of the "periphery" and the "core". Thus, a critical interpretation of the scholarly works of Rodney (1972), James (1997) and Alvin (1990) pointed to an asymmetric economic interrelatedness in which the "periphery" overtly relies on the "core" for trade, investments and financial manipulations to settle balance-of-payments dues. Central Bank of Nigeria (2000) and Chemengich (2002) extensively argued that the collective ideas of dependency theory were intended to criticise the economic marginalisation created


by the “core” countries, which either exchange their advanced products for agricultural commodities or offset the periphery’s global financial indebtedness with their supposed trade profits.

Unequal Commodity Exchange

Dependency theory argues that a wide range of unequal levels of commodity exchange in the international markets was created. Trade was a major factor in international integration, bringing together both wealthy and poor states under a peaceful agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). According to Esty (2003), the international system operates without physical violence against member states because it ensures peaceful coexistence, irrespective of the enormity of errors committed; boundaries are respected by complying with standing rules.

Hence, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established to codify global agreements and set common principles and rules governing member countries under democratic governments, with the aim of reducing trade barriers and addressing other issues affecting member states. As lofty as the charter of GATT was, aimed at meeting the needs of member states, Jike (1998) observed that GATT lacks the ability to address challenges arising from evolving trade issues and is insufficiently capable of meeting members’ demands. This scenario led to the re-envisioning of a legally empowered World Trade Organisation (WTO) on January 1, 1995, following the Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1994. The World Trade Organisation became a more efficient institution for tackling trade disputes among member states. In fulfilment of the above, Adu-Peters (2010) posited that Nigeria was dragged before the WTO for exporting substandard cocoa to the European Union (EU) markets and was penalised by the issuance of a new Export Processing Agreement (EPA) requiring tariff payments on cocoa exports. In addition, the peaceful operation of the international system, according to Finn (2001), implies that the WTO's operations since 1995, involving adjudication of trade-related issues, have been peaceful mediation and reconciliation without threatening the international system. However, the United Nations (1987) and Oladunjoye (2008), on the developing-nations consensus wing, postulated that trade liberalism is a weapon of the European Union against poor countries, whose trade commodities are agro-economic, with low labour wages and constant high indebtedness due to poverty-driven policies. Apparently, dependency theory criticised a relaxed economy of constantly high tariffs on cocoa exports from developing countries, especially Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Cameroon, and Nigeria, among the remaining major cocoa-exporting countries worldwide.

Figure 1: Chart showing the world’s cocoa-exporting countries



Source: General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 2001

The above chart typified the position of Oyejide & Bankole (2001) on the developing states’ view of WTO, which at Seattle in 1999, critical concerns about the imbalance accompanying cocoa export from West Africa and other parts of the world, and the need to correct the trade agreement were among their focal points. In the 1980s, for instance, Brazil lost its position as the second-largest exporting country due to a

price decline, becoming a low-quantity producer. It was a gloomy decade for world cocoa producers and exporters because many exporters' Gross Domestic Product depended on the agrarian sector. Invariably, there was a significant imbalance in the trade commodities between the two blocs. On this premise, scholars of dependency theory often argue that state actors, whether wealthy or poor, tend to use economic power to protect their national interests in the international system. Thus, there is a need for developing states to clearly identify the factors that determine their interest in entering trade relations with advanced states, which continue to dictate terms within the WTO. (Rugumanu 2001) observed that the opinions of developing countries were rarely considered in trade decisions made. For instance, Nigeria can only protect its trade interests "if and only if" it identifies them and has viable commodities (advanced) as solid grounds to accommodate its negotiations within the committee agenda. For instance, Aluko (2003) submitted that the WTO's 1996 annual report stated that the top 15 exporters of services from developed states accounted for 73 per cent of the world's total imports. The United States of America taking the lead in most cases and no African country has taken part in this exclusive league. It was observed by Robbins & Ferris (2009) that the quest for national interest, which was a dominant political factor in the hands of the wealthy states over the poor states, often degenerated into prolonged, heated phenomena and cold, diplomatic misunderstandings in the international arena. Conversely, the Western (modern) school of thought postulated that the nature of national politics in various African states remained a home-inflicted saga that hindered their growth and functionality in the international system. This is reflective of the position pushed forward by Esty (2003), a world Economist that

Sub-Saharan Africa has what it takes to become a key player and beneficiary in the WTO; however, it has become the breeding ground for international terrorism. The continent has many oppressive governments. A sprinkling of chaotic failed states... it sounds as if Osama Bin Laden's platoons were furiously active in Africa, where a string of failed governments and sit-tight dictators have promoted unprecedented civil unrest in decades.

In view of the above, scholars of dependency theory such as Clemens (2011), Azizli (2013) and Ghosh (2019) believe that all member-states, irrespective of social or economic backgrounds, should have equal access to WTO meeting proceedings to encourage a better understanding of its works and possibly reduce some of the allegations directed at it by the aggrieved member-states. Hence, WTO remains an edge-cutting instrument for economic readjustment for equity in the international system.

Dependency theorists further argued that all nations admitted to international organisations have the primary motive of promoting their accrued political power, regardless of the negative implications for less powerful states. In this context, Jike (1998) posited that wealthy states relied on their trade commodities, such as automobiles and other technologies, to eclipse the bargaining power of member states with commodities from the agrarian economy. Such agrarian commodities were further subjected to a rigorous process of acceptance into EU markets or faced outright rejection. It remained widely believed that countries that became members of international organisations such as the WTO prioritised self-preservation to gain influence in pursuit of social, political and economic imperatives. A clear idea in this case is projected through understanding the concept of international trade itself and its mythos. International trade has overtime raised polemics in the academia and among other researchers where right and left critics viewed it differently, for instance, Khor (2003) and Stiglitz (2003) of the developing states school of thought posited that marginalisation or deterioration experience incurred by many countries continued to perpetuate them in endless indebtedness, low commodity pricing, lack of infrastructure and are unable to cope with problems of liberalisation and unable to benefit from export opportunities. Global trade extends the economic disparity between the North (wealthy) and the South (poor) as the gulf between the two hemispheres widens continually.

Stiglitz (2003) opines that the pontificated nudge of self-preservation from the developing countries' view of international or global trade also signalled leverage on a trajectory consideration of the essence of international trade from the developed countries' view. Thus, developed (wealthy) countries scholars, including Boone (1995), (GATT &Williamon, 2002) and (Soludo, 2008) believe that international trade necessitated foreign aid and assistance from the west to the developing countries, Bräutigam (2004) further claimed that international trade encouraged economic diversification, even though it involved agricultural commodities from Africa, the advanced countries possessed the technologies to process them into finished goods. The above is not far removed from what is called self-preservation by both developed and

developing countries in the international system. The originality of this debate is premised on the truth that international membership and national interest are inseparable. The benevolence of dependency theory as an instrument for mitigating the economic scars inflicted on poor countries from the age of colonisation to the modern dispensation is drifting towards irrelevance. Thus, world affairs, with reference to trade and investments, are becoming extremely competitive, shifting self-preservation (national interest) from international affairs, making it unattainable because state ideas are vested and shrouded in contest, deceit, and subtle war to enforce national foreign policies by member-states.

Consequences of the International Trade Face-off on Nigeria

The manifestation of dependency theory in Nigeria's export trade was captured in Adu-Peters (2010) analysis, which stated that Nigeria's refusal to sign the Export Processing Agreement led to the imposition of a trade agreement penalty known as the Semi-Processed Tariff (SPT). This agreement was issued to Nigeria to regulate its cocoa exports, a further attestation to the trade imbalance between the wealthy states and Nigeria, as posited by Akinremi and Awolunate (2010), that the WTO's penalty was a deliberate threat to ostracise Nigeria from cocoa exports. The new penalty attracted a 10 per cent tariff payable on Nigeria's agricultural products. To avert permanent exclusion from the cocoa export trade with the EU, Nigeria immediately drafted a new trade charter with cocoa exporters, detailing a series of tax regimes to mitigate the effects of the EU's 10 per cent import tariffs.




Figure 1 Field Survey 2010

Invocation of National Taxation

The above chart indicates that the major precipitating factors of the WTO's penalty were the unpredictability of terms and conditions of trade, which led Nigeria to constantly rely on the European Union for its commodity exports. The EU's arbitrary use of international market-negotiation powers automatically necessitated the government's unexpected imposition of a national tax directly on Nigerian exporters. In other words, Akinwale (2009) established that most cocoa exporters from Nigeria were unaware of the WTO's Export Processing Agreement issued against them. They reported that over 75 per cent of exporters in Nigeria were negatively affected by the new trade agreement. The above position was in tandem with James (1997) and Prebisch (1998), who maintained that poor countries exporting primary commodities, including cocoa, will continue to incur trade deficits due to volatile terms of trade, and high volumes of such commodities will constantly chase fewer of the processed items from the wealthy states. Iyama, (2009) reiterates that the exporters struggled to absorb the shock which suddenly hit their export

business alongside the regime of home tax paid at the seaports on certified seedlings for export. This tax was named the Nigerian Export Supervision Scheme (NESS), with a fixed amount of five dollars (US\$5) imposed on each tonne of cocoa at the shipping point. (Akinwale 2009) buttressed that the frequency of tonnage determined the total amount of NESS paid per export. Free on Board (FOB) tax also emerged, attracting 0.5 per cent of the commodity's value, and its imposition depended on the frequency of landings. (Benade & Woodgate, 2009) explained that those taxes were paid to Nigerian Officers at the seaports, while clearances or export licences were issued to exporters as a seal of authority to ship their cocoa beans to international markets. Arguments of dependency theory and findings in this study are in tandem with the categorical submission of Oladunjoye (2009) that

EPA was an agreement designed to satisfy international 'trade arbiters,' and it was unilaterally designed by the EU. It was commonly referred to as "an unclear and untested set of rules for a bilateral free trade agreement between the European Union and some of the world's poorest countries, which have no significant items for trade in the international markets.

It was further contested that the reason behind the invocation of EPA by the EU was to cunningly reintroduce the old tariff of 4.2 per cent and 6.4 per cent, otherwise referred to as Standard Import Tariff (SIT), *ab initio* imposed on West African cocoa export, which was subsumed by the adoption of deregulation and liberalisation. This, in essence, confirmed that trade relations between Nigeria and the EU have never been free, despite recent trade deregulation and liberalisation. Unpredictable tax imposition resulted in capital flight and economic strangulation.

Change from Trade Balance to Payment by Discount

Terms of trade and agreements were determined and imposed on Nigeria by the European Union (Oladunjoye, 2009), buttressed by the fact that while other West African cocoa exporting countries continued to enjoy a balance of trade payment, in the case of Nigeria, trade negotiations changed from a balance of trade to payment by discount. Whereas payment by discount reduces the percentage of total export tonnage in favour of the European buyers, Nigeria continues to bear the cost. 72.67 per cent of cocoa exporters in Nigeria were afraid of losing their trade partnership with the EU, and their fear became heightened by the lack of national markets to buy their raw cocoa, except for a very few emerging confectioneries like the STANMARK processing industry in Ondo State. Nigeria depended on the European Union's technologies and infrastructure to purchase and consume cocoa bean products. On this premise, Iyama, Oladunjoye, Adhuzo and Akinwale (2009) perceived international trade in agricultural commodities as inimical to national economic growth amid a series of volatile trade rules and regulations. More discouraging was the lack of adequate feedback on new trade policies conveyed to partners from developing countries, including Nigeria.

Conclusion

The major blueprint of the WTO was the privatisation of the national economies across the globe, with emphasis on the abrogation of subsidies. The idea sounded feasible for member states to comply with, but an adequate opportunity was not given to the developing countries, whose governance was seriously enmeshed in a series of national challenges and impoverishment. The major challenge for Nigeria was the error of adopting a total hands-off policy by its government, given the age-old colonial legacies of depleted infrastructure and low domestic output. Cocoa exporters in Nigeria soberly submitted that cocoa export's benefits remained overtly astonishing when viewed with the series of unpredictability that oftentimes rendered its workability questionable in the poor countries. Agricultural subsidy is a great harbinger of economic productivity, a factor that will continue to lubricate the agricultural sector of developed countries and was abruptly abrogated by Nigeria upon the endorsement and announcement of SAP. Switzerland and the United States of America still account for a significant share of subsidies in the agricultural sector; coming down home are Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Cameroon, which continue to receive government subsidies for their cocoa exports. Hence, to rescue Nigeria's agricultural sector from its looming death row, stakeholders should rise to face the challenges and shine a light at the end of the tunnel for sustainable development.

References

- Adu-Peters, R. O. (2010). Analysis of the Influence of the World Trade Organisation on Nigeria's Cocoa Export Trade, M. Phil Dissertation submitted to the Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife
- Allen, R. C. (2009). *Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press. pp. 127–129. Retrieved 24-02- 2016
- Aluko, S. (2003). Background to Globalisation and Africa's Economic Development, Ibadan, University Press, 35-45
- Alvin, S. (1990). *Social Change and Development: Modernisation, Dependency, and World-Systems Theory*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Akinwale, O. (2003). Reflections on the Nigerian Cocoa. Akure, Pearls Publishers), 61-96
- Boone, P. (1995). Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid. NBER Working Paper Series, Cambridge University Press, doi:10.3386/w5308, retrieved 20-04-2021
- Bräutigam, D. (2004). "Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa" *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 52 (2): 255–285. doi:10.1086/380592. S2CID 153868784 retrieved 30-03-2026
- Chemengich, P. (2006). The Challenges African Countries Face in the Multilateral Trading System, AERC Research News No 7, November 29.
- Azizli, I. (2013). Dependency Theory, History, Principles. Perspectives and Criticism" Seminar Paper Munich, GRIN Publishers 1-4 <https://grin/document/364640> Retrieved 30-03-2026
- Dani, I (2007). Africa Commodity Dependence, Resource Export Diversification. *African Development Perspective*, vol.1, 67
- Darwin, C. (1859). *Origin of Species*, United Kingdom, John Murray Press, 71
- Ebai, S. (2003). Building A New Future in the Liberalised Market Place, Producers' Perspective. Cocoa Association of Nigeria, Akure, Pearls, 7-22
- Esty, C. (2003). Greening World Trade, "Jeffrey J. Schott (ed.) *The World Trading System: Challenges Ahead*, Washington, Institute for International Economic Affairs, 205-43
- Felix, O. (2008). World Trade Organisation's Rules on Cocoa Export. *Weekly Trade News Digest* vol. 12 (7) May, 3-5
- Finn, J. (2001). Decision-Making in the World Trade: Continuing Reforms in the Agricultural Sector Trade: WTO Summit, Geneva, June 22.
- GATT (2004) Committee on Trade and Development in Nigeria, Managing the Challenges of WTO's Participation in Trade Sub-Regional Trade Summit, Abuja, March 10
- Ghosh, B. N. (2019). Dependency Theory" in Ghosh, B. N. (ed.), Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315187389. ISBN 978-1-315-18738-9. S2CID 141776092.
- Harrison, E. (2013). *Post-Cold War International System*, New York, Routledge
- James, P. (1997). Post dependency? The Third World in an Era of Globalism and Late-Capitalism. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*. 22 (2): 205–226. doi:10.1177/030437549702200204.
- Jike, M. (1998). Reports on the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Geneva, (14) vol. 10

- Johnson, W. (2016). *Realism and the Liberal Tradition: The International Relations Theory*, USA, Springer, 124–28.
- Khor, M. (2003). *Globalisation and the South: Some Critical Issues*, (Ibadan, Spectrum Books, 1-60
- Olagbaju, J. O. (2003). *Building A New Future in the Liberalised Marketplace*. Cocoa Association of Nigeria, Akure, Pearls, 5-16
- Oyejide, T. A. (2005). *Nigerian Trade Policy in the Context of Regional and Multilateral Trade Agreements* Development Policy Centre (DPC) No 27, Lagos.
- Oyejide, T. A., & Bankole, A. (2006). *The Geneva Agreement on Trade Tariffs in Services and Nigeria* Paper Presented at the Faculty of Administration Seminar Series, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, February 14.
- Prebisch, Singer (1998). *Terms of Trade Hypothesis*” in Sapsford, David and Chen, John-ren (eds.) *New Evidence*, Palgrave, Macmillan, pp 20-41
- Roberts, J. M. (2017). *Foreign Aid: Breaking the Cycle of Dependency*. The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved March 7
- Robbins & Ferris (2009). *The Impact of Globalisation on the Agricultural Sector*. International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, A Research Paper, Ibadan, September
- Rodrik, D. (2001). *The Global Governance of Trade as if Development Reality Mattered*”, Being a Paper Presented at the United Nations Development Project, April 22,
- Rugumanu, S. M. (2001). *Globalisation and Africa Future:” Towards Structural Stability, Integration and Sustainability* AJPS/OPS, Zimbabwe, 256-8
- Soludo, C. (2008). *The North and the South Trade Connections in the International System: Inaugural Lecture* Delivered at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, September 12
- Stiglitz, J. (2003). *A Report on Developed and Developing Nations’ World Trade Organisations* (London, University Press, 215-35
- Williamon, L. (2002). *“Globalisation, Good or Bad?”* The Guardian, August, vol. 24 (9), United Kingdom
- Williams, M. (2014). *The End of the Developmental State?* Routledge, ISBN 978-0415854825, retrieved 23-05-2024